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Abstract
In order to fully explore this territory, it is essential to 
appreciate how both Brexit and Human Rights fit within 
the wider “Constitutional Culture” of the State. The arti-
cle starts this discussion with an examination of what 
the concept of Constitutional Culture signifies, both 
generally, and also within the specific and idiosyncratic 
context of the United Kingdom. Then, it explores how 
human rights fit within British Constitutional Culture 
and assesses how the Brexit saga relates to both British 
Constitutional Culture and human rights as they exist 
within this paradigm. Having addressed the nature of 
British Constitutional Culture, the place of human rights 
within it and the impact of the Brexit process, the role of 
referenda in our democratic processes will be discussed, 
alongside the function of human rights, in sense of iden-
tifiable freedoms which can be named and asserted, 
within whatever form of new Constitutional Culture and 
settlement ultimately emerges. 
Keywords: Brexit; human rights; Constitutional Culture; 
United Kingdom; referenda.
Resumo
Para explorar completamente esse território, é essencial 
apreciar como o Brexit e os Direitos Humanos se encaixam 
na “Cultura Constitucional” mais ampla do Estado. O artigo 
inicia esta discussão examinando o que significa o concei-
to de cultura constitucional, tanto em geral como também 
dentro do contexto específico e idiossincrático do Reino 
Unido. Em seguida, explora como os direitos humanos 
se encaixam na Cultura Constitucional Britânica e avalia 
como a saga do Brexit se relaciona à Cultura Constitucional 
Britânica e aos direitos humanos conforme a sua existência 
nesse paradigma. Tendo abordado a natureza da cultura 
constitucional britânica, o lugar dos direitos humanos nela 
e o impacto do processo Brexit, o papel dos referendos em 
nossos processos democráticos será discutido, juntamente 
com a função dos direitos humanos, no sentido de liberda-
des identificáveis que podem ser nomeadas e afirmadas, 
sob qualquer forma de nova cultura e assentamento cons-
titucional que surja.
 
Palavras-chave: Brexit; direitos humanos; Cultura Consti-
tucional; Reino Unido; referendo..
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1. INTRODUCTION
At the time of writing, both the United Kingdom and the European Union are 
standing with their toes over the edge of the Brexit cliff, uncertain what awaits when 
they leap from the precipice.1  Whilst there are innumerable unanswered questions, 
this article focuses on one particular aspect of the situation: namely the future of hu-
man rights in a post-Brexit United Kingdom.  In order to fully explore this territory, it is 
essential to appreciate how both Brexit and Human Rights fit within the wider “Consti-
tutional Culture” of the State.  As we shall in due course argue, the notion of Constitu-
tional Culture has not been in the forefront of either juridical or political thought, in the 
stumbling and contested journey towards a break with the European Union, and this 
oversight has been extremely damaging.
In light of this, we are going to begin our discussion with an examination of 
what the concept of Constitutional Culture signifies, both generally, and also within 
the specific and idiosyncratic context of the United Kingdom.  Once this groundwork is 
established, we shall be in a position to build upwards in layers: firstly, exploring how 
human rights fit within British Constitutional Culture; and secondly, assessing how the 
Brexit saga relates to both British Constitutional Culture and human rights as they exist 
within this paradigm. Having thus constructed our analytical tower, we shall have a 
good vantage point of the territory we are surveying, and shall be able to draw some 
general conclusions.
1  ROS, Taylor. Is Boris Johnson’s Brexit posturing just a power play? LSE Brexit, London, 31 jul. 2019. Available 
at: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/07/31/is-boris-johnsons-brexit-posturing-just-a-power-play/>.  Last 
accessed: 9 dec. 2019; SZUCKO, Angélica. The EU’s institutional response to the Brexit vote. LSE Brexit, London, 
22 jul. 2019. Available at: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/07/22/eus-institutional-response-to-the-brex-
it-vote/>. Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
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2.  CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
2.1.  Constitutional Culture as a Concept
It should surprise nobody that the concept of Constitutional Culture has been 
widely discussed by academic commentators within the United States,2 given the place 
which the Constitution has in the popular imagination and discourse, and indeed, in 
forging the collective sense of national identity.3  Nevertheless, it is by no means con-
fined to that setting, it is a concept of universal applicability, and authors from various 
jurisdictions have fruitfully applied it to their work.4  There is no single authoritative de-
finition of the term, however Llewelyn’s observation from the first half of the twentieth 
century goes a long way towards capturing its essence.5  He described the Constitution 
as “an institution” which provided a “set of ways of living and doing”.
For current purposes, my own proposed definition would be as follows: “the col-
lective set of norms which are freely and widely embraced to govern common life and 
decision making within the State”.  
Crucially, it must be understood that for a precept to be truly part of Constitutio-
nal Culture, it does not suffice to be able to point to an official instrument or declaration 
in which exists, nor some awareness of it in theory.  For instance, although the 1936 
Constitution of the USSR guaranteed freedom of religion,6 speech and assembly,7 these 
did not form part of the Constitutional Culture of the USSR, as they were not present in 
the “living and doing” of that society.  There was no widespread expectation that such 
rights were guaranteed, nor even a consensus that in practical terms they should have 
been.  Conversely, it could justly be said that the social and medical provision for the 
sick and elderly, also assured in the Constitution,8 did truly form part of the Constitu-
tional Culture, given that this was both implemented and widely accepted as a correct 
and legitimate principle.9 It should be stressed that Constitutional Culture is comprised 
2  See for example GOLDSWORTHY, Jeffrey. Constitutional Cultures, Democracy, and Unwritten Principles. 
University of Illinois Law Review, Champaign, v. 18, n. 2, p. 683-710, apr. 2012.
3  KASPER, Eric T.; VIEREGGE, Quentin D. The United States Constitution in Film: Part of Our National Cul-
ture. New York: Lexington Books, 2018.
4  UTIZ, Renáta. The Constitutional Text in the Light of History. In: UITZ, Renáta. Constitutions, Courts and 
History: Historical Narratives in Constitutional Adjudication. Budapest: Central European University Press, 
2005.
5  LLEWELLYN, K. N. The Constitution as an Institution. Columbia Law Review. New York, v. 34, n. 1, p. 1-40, 
jan. 1934.
6  UNITED SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS. Constitution of 1936, article 124.
7  UNITED SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS. Constitution of 1936, article 125.
8  UNITED SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS. Constitution of 1936, article 120.
9  MILLAR, James R.  Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. p. 49.
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of both legal and extra-legal sources, it is made up of both legal instruments and prin-
ciples, as well as social and cultural expectations which exist in society, outside of the 
confines of the juridical framework.
It must also be understood that Constitutional Culture entails more than the 
passive approval of a critical mass of citizens, even if this support is enthusiastic.  As 
Mazzone argued in relation to the emergence of the United States as a nation State, the 
successful establishment of constitutional Government was only possible because the 
majority of ordinary Americans were prepared to accept that their collective life would 
be ordered by the constitutional document.10  His highly persuasive thesis is that there 
could have be no USA as we currently know it, with the Constitutional Culture which 
we now take for granted, had countless men and women whose lives did not make the 
history books, not chosen to come on board with the vision of the Founding Fathers.
Constitutional Culture does not describe abstract norms, but ones which 
lawyers, politicians and citizens in general accept and expect to be implemented.  Gi-
ving them form and substance, assuring their continuity whilst imagining them afresh 
in each new generation is a project which can only really function at a societal level.  As 
Heller expressed it, Constitutional Culture is formed: “not just by text, judges or legisla-
tors, but by the citizens who are its addressees and observe its norms”.11
Having established this though, we are left with some interesting questions 
about contexts in which there is no codified constitutional document for citizens to 
affirm or reject, no bounded body of words to “address” the nation in Heller’s termino-
logy.  Clearly, we need to resolve this riddle when looking at the United Kingdom
2.2.  Constitutional Culture and the United Kingdom
A provocative way of beginning this section would be to demand how a State 
can have a Constitutional Culture without having a Constitution, as many citizens, due 
to the idiosyncratic nature of our legal arrangements, consider that the United King-
dom does not have a Constitution as such. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom has a 
Constitution, which is uncodified, and in part unwritten, and as a result it is especially 
well placed to absorb some of the implications of Constitutional Culture.12 Significantly, 
even States with a codified Constitution tend to have important streams of Constitu-
tional Culture which spring from sources outside of their textual canon.  
10  MAZZONE, Jason. The Creation of a Constitutional Culture. Tulsa Law Review, Tulsa, v. 40, n. 4, p. 961-683, 
oct./dec. 2004. 
11  HELLER, Hermann. The Nature and Structure of the State. Cardozo Law Review, New York, v. 18, n. 3, p. 
1139-1216, dec. 1996.
12  ALLAN, Trevor. The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution and Common Law. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2013. p. 17-54.
Brexit, Human Rights and the Role of Constitutional Culture
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 6, n. 3, p. 573-594, set/dez. 2019. 577
For instance, as Waldman13 has demonstrated, the place which the right to bear 
arms has within the American legal framework is one forged by judicial decisions, albeit 
in cases related to the Second Amendment.  The evolution of this right and its place 
within modern law, and just as significantly, in contemporary American society well 
beyond courtrooms and universities, does not come from the codified corpus of the 
Constitution.  Indeed Cornell observes, there is a respected body of academic opin-
ion arguing that what is now often trumpeted as an individual liberty, was in reality 
originally intended to guarantee only a collective freedom to bear arms in organised 
military groups.14  Yet the Second Amendment has become bound up with numerous 
narratives and identities aside from that revolutionaries resisting the oppression of the 
British Crown: inter alia, the rugged, hardworking and self-reliant pioneer, as well as 
honest citizens defending their life and property against lawlessness, and a whole spec-
trum of cultural tropes around race and gender.15  
Undoubtedly, American debates on gun-control raise extremely complex and 
thought-provoking debates, and I have no desire to allow our current ship of discussion 
to get sucked in by weighing up the validity of such contentions. Nonetheless, I would 
like to simply observe that even in a paradigm with the archetypal codified constitu-
tional document, there are key elements of Constitutional Culture formed by factors 
independent of the text.  In order words, the Constitution as an institution for living 
and doing, and the expectations built upon it, are partially unwritten, even in the USA.
Therefore, given that Constitutional Culture does not flow from the gravitation 
pull of a single, sacred text, it is in no way problematic to suggest that it is also present 
in contexts without such a document. All States will indeed have some form of Consti-
tutional Culture, because in all contexts there will be a set of collective expectations 
about the operation of the legal and political framework.  In Britain, part and parcel of 
this is the expectation that the Constitution is not a sacrosanct entity which should be 
self-contained or walled off, whilst constitutional principles are woven into the fabric of 
the juridical system as a whole. The lack of any rigid divide means that in both academia 
and practice, public lawyers must be familiar with private law principles and vice versa, 
and also the absence of any designated Constitutional Court means that there is no 
perception of the judiciary as the primary guardians of the constitutional order. In this 
framework, the judges are simply one of the bodies with a role to play in this.16  Conse-
13  WALDMAN, Michael. The Second Amendment: A Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014. p. 161.
14  CORNELL, Saul. A Well Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in America. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 167-210.
15  For a variety of perspectives see YUILL, Kevin; STREET, Joe (Eds.). The Second Amendment and Gun Con-
trol: Freedom, Fear and the American Constitution. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017.
16  MASTERMAN, Roger. The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2010.
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quently, it is natural that there is a sense of collective responsibility for the Constitution, 
as it is embodied in, not merely carried out, by political processes in which everybody 
has a stake.
Perhaps ironically, the American Revolution provides us with one of the most 
convincing proofs of this aspect of the British Constitution, and its Constitutional Cul-
ture.  John Adams, one of the intellectual powerhouses behind the revolt, repeatedly 
stressed that the behaviour of the Parliament in Westminster was in flagrant breach of 
the British Constitution.17  Given that Britain did not provide for the colonies to send any 
representatives to that assembly, Adams and others regarded its demands for revenue 
as unconstitutional, and said so in those terms.  Their basis for doing so was rooted 
in collective expectations which had gradually coalesced over time, as the concept of 
no taxation without representation was at the very least foreshadowed by the Mag-
na Carta.18  Without a doubt the great XVII century Sir Edward Coke found within the 
then already ancient text a justification for asserting English liberties, much to the ire 
of Stuart Monarchs and the ultimate benefit of the parliamentary cause.19  One of the 
greatest sparks which set alight the conflagration of the Civil Wars, and eventually a pe-
riod of Republican government, was Charles I’s effort to use ship money as a backdoor 
means of levying tax without recalling Parliament.20  This point was certainly not lost 
on the American Colonies when they found themselves subjected to the payment of 
duty without their consent, and as far as the rebels/patriots were concerned, long held 
liberties were being infringed.
Yet it is true that, as Baker demonstrates with great erudition, the Magna Car-
ta had been interpreted for centuries in ways which would have astounded its origi-
nal signatories,21 and the vindication for Adams’ position did not really come from the 
words on the medieval parchment. Nevertheless, the notion that the Crown could not 
levy taxation without obtaining the agreement of its subjects, had smashed its way 
into British Constitutional Culture with the legitimating power of the Great Charter, and 
17  ADAMS, John. Instructions Adopted by the Braintree Town Meeting. Available at: <http://www.massh-
ist.org/publications/adams-papers/index.php/view/PJA01d073>. Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
18  ENGLAND. Magna Carta of 1215, clause 14: “To obtain the general consent of the realm for the assessment 
of an ‘aid’ - except in the three cases specified above - or a ‘scutage’, we will cause the archbishops, bishops, 
abbots, earls, and greater barons to be summoned individually by letter. To those who hold lands directly of us 
we will cause a general summons to be issued, through the sheriffs and other officials, to come together on a 
fixed day (of which at least forty days notice shall be given) and at a fixed place. In all letters of summons, the 
cause of the summons will be stated. When a summons has been issued, the business appointed for the day 
shall go forward in accordance with the resolution of those present, even if not all those who were summoned 
have appeared.” Available at: <https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation>. 
Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
19  BAKER, John. The Reinvention of the Magna Carta. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. chap-
ter 9.
20  PURKISS, Diane. The English Civil War. London: Harper Perennial, 2006. p. 22-23.
21  BAKER, John. The Reinvention of the Magna Carta. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
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regardless of what the document said or was intended to say, it spawned a collective 
understanding that taxation without consent was not part of the English, and later Brit-
ish, mode of conducting civil affairs.
As we have already stressed, extra-textual sources of Constitutional Culture are 
by no means a unique feature of non-codified Constitutions. Notwithstanding this, it 
would be disingenuous to pretend that the lack of codification is not a complicating 
factor in some contexts.  Obviously, there is a link between Constitutional Culture and 
the content of the State Constitution, and as we shall see in relation to Brexit, there is 
scope for confusion and anger when the legal content of the Constitution itself is not 
clear, and therefore the assumptions and expectations around it are not clear either.  
Generally speaking, there is a risk of differing groups believing that their un-
derstanding of the rules is the correct one, and feeling aggrieved when these are not 
applied, especially by those wielding judicial or political power.  It is a not that differ-
ent from the situation in which a classic board game, such as Monopoly or Scrabble, is 
being played by a group of friends.  It is indeed common for families to develop their 
own slight variations on the rules, yet for everyone to assume that their way of playing 
is the normative one.  Despite the fact that trouble ensues when there is a clash of ex-
pectations, at least in that instance there is the possibility of reading the rule-book (or 
codified Constitution) provided in the box.  
Of course, in the case of an uncodified Constitution, there is no safety valve of 
an agreed “rule-book” to which participants in disputes may have recourse, and rather 
than arguing about the meaning of certain rules, the discussion actually relates to their 
very existence. Passionate disagreements are likely to take place as a result.  A recent 
example of this arose in relation to parliamentary procedure, when the Speaker applied 
a principle from the Erskine May handbook to prevent the then Prime Minister Theresa 
May from bringing forward a further vote on the proposed Brexit deal.22  The move 
was controversial, because he was known to personally oppose the agreement present-
ed, and arguably he had not chosen to invoke the rule in relation to debates towards 
which he was personally sympathetic.  In the United Kingdom, although a member of 
one of the political parties, there is an uncompromising expectation that the Speaker 
remains a neutral figure, and it is rare for the holder of the office to even arouse suspi-
cion of failing in this commitment, and controversy over the currency, and therefore 
validity, of a rule dating from the English Civil War did nothing to quell the political 
storm which blew up.  Nevertheless, it is also important to observe that even had the 
rule been included within a codified Constitution, there would still have been ample 
scope for accusations of the Speaker having applied it in a partisan manner.  It would be 
22  CHAPLAIN, Chloe. What is Erskine May?  The £400 handbook that guides Parliament and John Bercow’s 
decisions? Inews Briefing, [s.l.], 19 mar. 2019. Available at:    <https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/what-is-er-
skine-may-parliamentary-rulebook/>. Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
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helpful to stress that the wording in dispute was as follows: “a question being once made, 
and carried in the affirmative or negative, cannot be questioned again, but must stand as 
a judgement of the House”.23 And thus gives plenty of scope for debate as to whether a 
question may be put before the House of Commons in the same session of Parliament, 
because if circumstances in the outside world change, then the “question” being raised 
is no longer the same, even if the wording of a Bill is unchanged.  How different must 
the wording of the issue, or the external context be, in order to provide a “fresh” ques-
tion and avoid infringing the precept?  Obviously, there is no hard and fast answer, as 
human judgement must always be applied, giving rise to potential controversy.  In light 
of this, codification is not a panacea against uncertainty, nor will alter the reality that 
constitutional matters occupy the borderland between law and politics.
Furthermore, it is fair to highlight that not all aspects of the British Constitu-
tion are fluid or debatable, and a number of its fundamental characteristics are beyond 
doubt. It is a monarchical, representative parliamentary democracy, with established/
quasi-established national Churches, and is supported by the key principles of the Rule 
of Law, Checks and Balances (sometimes designated a weak form of Separation of Pow-
ers) and Parliamentary Sovereignty.24 Many modern commentators would also treat 
human rights as a constitutional pillar, a discussion to which we shall shortly return.25  
Nevertheless, the vast swathes of grey around the edges Constitution are per-
haps another feature of British Constitutional Culture.  Opinion polls continue to show 
widespread support for an “unwritten” Constitution, and many are proud of this nation-
al distinctiveness and regard the adaptability which it lends as an asset.26  Although 
Tomkins is correct in noting the danger of binary distinctions between written and un-
written Constitutions, including the casual assumption that the latter are more rigid 
than the former,27 from the point of Constitutional Culture, this is a secondary issue. 
The key consideration is that people believe it to be flexible and actively embrace this 
dimension, and whether they are intellectually misguided to do so is a secondary point. 
In other words, the lack of codification does not leech away at legitimacy or willingness 
to participate.
23  GARCÍA OLIVA, Javier; HALL, Helen.  Parliament, the Executive and the Speaker. Balancing Beliefs Blog. 20 
mar. 2019. Available at: <http://www.projects.law.manchester.ac.uk/religion-law-and-the-constitution/parlia-
ment-and-executive-brexit-and-the-speaker/>. Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
24  GARCÍA OLIVA, Javier; HALL, Helen. Religion, Law and the Constitution: Balancing Beliefs in Britain. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2017. chapters 1 and 2.
25  ELLIOTT, Mark; THOMAS, Robert. Public Law. 3. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. p. 759-815.
26  UNITED KINGDOM. Parliament of the United Kingdom. UK Parliament, A New Magna Carta?  Political 
and Constitutional Reform. Available at:     <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmpol-
con/463/46308.htm>. Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
27  TOMKINS, Adam. Public Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. p. 7-10.
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Drawing these threads together, we can see that the United Kingdom not only 
has a rich and interesting constitutional framework, it also has a lively Constitutional 
Culture, a consideration which naturally brings us to our next question: how do human 
rights fit into this culture?
3.  HUMAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
Anyone familiar with the present British context will be aware that to investigate 
this topic is to open a can, or possible several cans, of rather aggrieved worms. Taking a 
step backwards to begin with, it is important to appreciate some of the political build 
up to the Brexit vote and ensuing crisis. For decades there has been a simmering re-
sentment in some quarters over what was perceived as “European interference” in Bri-
tish affairs and a humiliating loss of autonomy,28  and this discontent extended to the 
jurisdiction of European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, as well as membership 
of the European Union.  David Cameron promised repeal of the Human Rights Act as a 
manifesto pledge at the 2016 election, and replace it with a “British Bill of Rights”, a po-
licy of which his successor Theresa May was also supportive.29  In the event, Cameron’s 
premiership ended with resignation after the Brexit referendum, and Theresa May put 
dealing with the Human Rights Act “on ice” until Brexit was resolved.30  
In contrast, the position of the present Prime Minister Boris Johnson is more 
difficult to tease out, making it rather tricky to read the runes.  He has spoken favoura-
bly about the Human Rights Act and even the Strasbourg Court, but at the same time 
stressed British sovereignty in deciding how to apply its rulings.31  Without doubt, it 
seems unlikely that there could be any attempt to tackle another political leviathan 
whilst battling Brexit, so it appears probable that the Human Rights Act is secure in the 
short term at least.  Furthermore, the indication that even if it was repealed, the statute 
would be replaced by another guarantee of rights, affirms the proposition that human 
rights are now part of British Constitutional Culture.  Even those most hostile towards 
28  FARRELL, Michelle; DRYWOOD, Eleanor; REYNOLDS, Stephanie; GREY, Harriet. Brexit and the Conservative 
Party Plans for the Human Rights Act. Liverpool University Law Blog, Liverpool, 1 feb. 2019. Available at: 
<https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/law/news/articles/brexit-and-the-conservatives-plans-for-the-human-rights-
act>. Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
29  WILDING, Jo. The Business of Asylum Justice and the Future of Human Rights. In: SMYTH, Claire-Michelle; 
LANG, Richard (Eds.). The Future of Human Rights in the UK. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2017. p. 111-130, 102.
30  MERRICK, Rob. Theresa May to Consider Axeing Human Rights Act After Brexit. The Independent, [s.l.], 18 
jan. 2019. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-human-rights-act-re-
peal-brexit-echr-commons-parliament-conservatives-a8734886.html>. Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
31  WALAWALKAR, Aaron. Boris Johnson: What is the next Prime Minister’s Human Rights Record? Each Other 
blog, 23 jul. 2019. Available at: <https://rightsinfo.org/boris-johnsons-human-rights-record/>. Last accessed: 9 
dec. 2019.
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the Human Rights Act are not rejecting the concept or desirability of human rights per 
se, which suggests that this approach no longer has political traction.
In order to understand the significance of this, it is important to appreciate what 
the Human Rights Act did and did not do. The legislation in the late twentieth century 
brought the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law for the first time 
(the United Kingdom is a dualist State, and therefore ratifying the treaty had not had 
this effect in the first place).32  This meant that for the first time, citizens had identifiable 
human rights which they could actively draw out and positively assert, but it is crucial 
to stress that this did not mean that prior to its passage, fundamental freedoms did 
not form part of the British Constitutional framework.  As Feldman explained it, before 
the new legislation came into force, citizens enjoyed an “undifferentiated mass of liber-
ty”,33  or in other words, individuals and groups had a right to express religious beliefs 
or exercise free speech etc, unless prevented by lawful means.  After the passage of 
the statute, this general concept of liberty was augmented by specific guarantees of 
particular freedoms, and it was possible to demand that the legal framework protected 
a positive and concrete right to freedom of religion, for example, by wearing a cross or 
a hijab at work.34
There can be no denying that the Human Rights Act 1998 was a watershed mo-
ment in the United Kingdom’s legal history, and one which has gradually had a profound 
effect on British Constitutional Culture, at both a popular and practitioner level.  Whilst 
judges are not permitted to “strike down” primary legislation, they are empowered to 
issue declarations of incompatibility, which are usually followed by the other branches 
of government.35 Furthermore, the task of interpreting even primary legislation must 
be carried out through with cognisance of human rights, according to established 
principles.  It is also true that although Parliament is free to ignore the Human Rights 
Act should it so chooses,36 there are express mechanisms to ensure that the legislature 
must at least take into account of the implications of proposed new law on Convention 
rights, and if it brushes them aside must be doing so publically and consciously.37  
Profound as this step change has been, the shift in thought-processes has not 
been confined to those who are tasked with crafting and interpreting laws. The impli-
cations of the cultural revolution can be observed at a popular level, in the reluctance 
32  AUST, Anthony. Handbook on International Law. 2. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p. 
25.
33  FELDMAN, David. Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. p. 68.
34  EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Eweida vs. United Kingdom, 2013.
35  UNITED KINGDOM. Human Rights Act, s4.
36  UNITED KINGDOM. Human Rights Act, ss3-4.
37  UNITED KINGDOM. Human Rights Act, s19.
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of those who oppose the Human Rights Act to be seen to attack human rights per se, 
as this stance is unlikely to lead to gains at the ballot-box with the contemporary elec-
torate.   Anti-European rhetoric may be employed to attack a “non-British” embodiment 
of rights, and more subtly, to oppose external intervention in questions of balancing 
rights,38 but it is now extremely difficult for politicians who wish to present themselves 
as caring, moderate and socially responsible, to reject the human rights project altoge-
ther, because this has become a position of fringe and extremist parties.
Although the importance of the societal move to embrace the language and 
ideology of human rights should not be underestimated, the seismic shift in judicial 
thinking is perhaps the biggest of the three developments so far outlined (cultural 
change for judges, Parliament and citizens in general).  In addition to applying the sta-
tutory principles of the Human Rights Act, this can be seen plainly and dramatically 
observed in the resurgence of the concept of “Common Law Rights”.  The theoretical 
underpinning of this lies in the notion that within the bundle of liberty described by 
Feldman, there have always been identifiable elements, which at times have been hi-
ghlighted as the values which the legal system recognises and protects.  For example, 
in the seminal XVIII century judgment in Somerset v Stewart Lord Mansfield had found 
that:
The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being introduced on any re-
asons, moral or political, but only by positive law, which preserves its force long after the 
reasons, occasions, and time itself from whence it was created, is erased from memory. 
It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law. Whatever in-
conveniences, therefore, may follow from the decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or 
approved by the law of England; and therefore the black must be discharged.39
In other words, chattel slavery was fundamentally incompatible with Common 
Law, and consequently, there was a right to freedom from slavery long before Article 4 
of the ECHR was incorporated into the British juridical framework.40  If slavery had ever 
been approved by “positive law” or statute, the courts would have had no choice, but 
to yield. However, given that this was not the case, it would not support an institution 
which was contrary to core legal rights and principles.
38  GIANNOULOPOULOS, Dimitrios. Britain must hold fast to the European Convention on Human Rights as it 
leaves the EU. LSE Brexit Blog, London, 24 nov. 2016. Available at: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/11/24/
britain-must-hold-fast-to-the-european-convention-on-human-rights-as-it-leaves-the-eu/>. Last accessed: 9 
dec. 2019.
39  UNITED KINGDOM. Court of King’s Bench. Somerset vs. Stewart, 1772. 
40  The nature of the dispute in Somerset v Stewart, and the way in which it was argued, make it appropriate 
to speak of “English law”.
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It must be acknowledged that Somerset’s Case was special and very well-known 
in its day,41 and the clarity with which rights and overarching principles were discussed 
is not necessarily typical. The truth is that retracing the evolution of legal thinking on 
fundamental rights is ordinarily more complicated, taking into consideration that in re-
ading pre-Human Rights Act case law it is often difficult to discern when the underlying 
values woven into the legal framework were being applied, as there was no need to 
articulate them, nor strong tradition of doing so. 
Significantly, almost by definition, common assumptions about moral principles 
and liberty operated below the surface of judicial reasoning.  For example, the “right” to 
corporal integrity is unquestionably at the heart of the ancient law of trespass, which 
encompasses a civil wrong as well as a crime, but in allowing an action in tort for tres-
pass, historically speaking, courts would not announce that they were vindicating such 
a right.42  Nevertheless, when lawyers stepped back to write books, discuss matters ex-
tra-judicially or to engage in legal education, they were likely to spell out matters more 
clearly, and for instance, William Blackstone described trespass in the following terms: 
“Trespass, in its largest and most extensive sense, signifies any transgression or offense 
against the law of nature, of society, or of the country in which we live; whether it rela-
tes to a man’s person, or his property”.43
Therefore, there is no question that these rights were present in the tradition of 
Common Law, although they were not always part of the everyday, bread and butter 
arguments which appeared in law reports.  Yet after the passage of the Human Rights 
Act, when judges naturally became more conscious of rights, there was a much gre-
ater tendency to overtly state that  human rights considerations were shaping their 
development of Common Law.44  It must be remembered, of course, that Common Law 
evolves incrementally, and human rights arguments could never provide a bridge whe-
re there was an obvious chasm in legal principles,45 but as commentators like Hunt46 
and Phillipson47 have argued, there is the possibility for what they have termed “weak 
41  HORNE, Gerald; HERRON, Larry. The Counter Revolution of 1776: Slave Resistance and the Origins of the 
United States of America. New York: New York University Press, 2014, p. 209.
42  UNITED KINGDOM. Court of King’s Bench. Scott vs. Shepherd, 1773. 
43  BLACKSTONE, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Book 3. Clarendon Press at Oxford, 1765-
1770. chapter 12.
44  UNITED KINGDOM. England and Wales Court of Appeal. Parkinson vs. St. James NHS Trust, 2001; HERRING, 
Jonathan; WALL, Jesse. The nature and significance of the right to bodily integrity. Cambridge Law Journal, 
Cambridge, v. 76, n. 3, p. 566-588, nov. 2017.
45  HARTSHORNE, John. The Need for an Intrusion upon Seclusion Privacy Tort within English Law. Common 
Law World Review, [s.l.], v. 46, n. 4, p. 287-305, nov. 2017.
46  HUNT, Murray. The Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Act. Public Law, London, n. 3, p. 423-443, sept./
nov. 1998.
47  PHILLIPSON, Gavin. The Human Rights Act, ‘Horizontal Effect’ and the Common Law: A Bang or a Whimper? 
The Modern Law Review, London, v. 62, n. 6, p. 824-849, nov. 1999.
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horizontal direct effect” of the Convention, which meant that the ECHR might provide 
Common Law with the impetus needed to jump from one stepping stone to another.   
In an era when the Human Right Act appeared secure, there was no need to pay 
too much attention to this phenomenon.  As Moreham has observed, Common Law 
rights frequently march in step with those of the Convention: where both would take 
the court to the same conclusion, it was of little consequence which one was placed 
in the foreground.48  For example, as we have seen, both Article 4 ECHR and Common 
Law prohibit slavery and forced labour, and the underlying principles of both support 
the long established rule that a court will never grant the equitable remedy of “specific 
performance” in the case of an employment contract.49 It has long been axiomatic this 
form of relief was not available, and it was no surprise that neither Common Law nor 
the ECHR would countenance compelling an individual to do a particular job on pain of 
punitive sanction.  It goes without saying, ink is not spilt by lawyers where there is no 
debate to be had, and there was no need to labour trite points.
Yet this position has changed once the Human Rights Act appeared to be in 
real jeopardy, and significantly, when faced with its possible demise, British courts are 
rediscovering the language of Common Law rights.  A clear and dramatic example of 
this is provided by the UNISON case,50 which concerned a dispute over policy on legal 
aid, making the concept of a right to a fair trial central to the arguments.  Remarkably, 
the Supreme Court chose to make its ruling entirely on the basis of the ancient and 
unquestioned Common Law right to a fair trial, and observed almost as a footnote that 
they could have reached the same conclusion via the application of Article 6.
In opting to apply Common Law rather than the Convention right here, the 
court was marking its territory with the determination (and indeed subtlety) of a dog 
at a lamppost, and whether or not Parliament might choose to repeal the Human Ri-
ght Act, the application of human rights-based principles is now an established and 
non-negotiable mode of judicial interpretation.   In other words, it has become part of 
British Constitutional culture.  
Having made that statement, however, it must be emphasised that I am not 
implying that the Supreme Court adopted any artifice, nor invented a non-existent 
Common Law right.  Quite the contrary, such a right does indeed have ancient pedi-
gree and recognition, once again being rooted in the Magna Carta.  It was also another 
concept cherished by John Adams, to whom I have already referred, who despite being 
48  MOREHAM, Nicole. Douglas and Others v Hello-the Protection of Privacy in English Private Law. Modern 
Law Review, London, v. 64, n. 5, p. 767-774, nov. 2001.
49  De Francesco v Barnum [1886-90]. In: All England Law Reports Reprint. London: Butterworths Law, 1996. 
p. 414, 418 per Fry LJ “I think that courts are bound to be jealous in case they should turn contracts of service 
into contracts of slavery”.
50  UNITED KINGDOM. Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. R (UNISON) vs. Lord Chancellor, 2017.
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a leading light of the patriot cause, bravely (and successfully) acted as a defence cou-
nsel for British soldiers accused of American murdering civilians in the “Boston massa-
cre”.51 Even in the XVIII century and the midst of a gathering political storm, the idea of 
denying individuals a fair trial was repugnant to lawyers steeped in the British Common 
Law tradition, and therefore, I am certainly not presenting the Supreme Court as having 
somehow stealthily introduced the concept by sleight of hand in 2017.  
My point really does not relate to what was done, but the chosen mode of doing 
it.  In preferring to base their analysis on Common Law, rather than the obvious Con-
vention right, which would have served equally well and without disadvantage, the 
court was trumpeting a loud message that independently of the Human Rights Act, 
identifiable and enumerated human rights are part of British Constitutional Culture, and 
will withstand the repeal of that statute. This is a very powerful statement.
Nevertheless, reassuring as this might be, the abolition of the Human Rights 
Act is not what is immediately on the cards.  Rather we are starring down the barrel of 
Brexit, so we shall now address what this might mean for both British Constitutional 
culture and human rights.
4.   BREXIT, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The impact of Brexit on British Constitutional Culture is worthy of many books 
and articles, and I do not pretend to have the capacity to cover it in detail here. Some 
commentators like Gearty are even suggesting that the whole debacle has killed the 
Constitution as we know it.52  Not only do I lack the space within the current discourse, 
it is also without doubt too early to fully assess the influence of Brexit in this regard, as 
cultural change is a slow process and the story is still unfolding.  Only when the dust 
settles, and a new form or normality is established, either post-Brexit, or (now far less 
likely) in the aftermath of a firm decision to recant and remain, we shall be able to start 
examining the new position. Consequently, I will confine myself to the two ways in 
which the Brexit saga has interacted with the pre-existing Constitutional Culture, in so 
far as both are directly pertinent to human rights: referenda and Parliament and the 
People.
4.1.  Referenda and the British Constitution
This is good illustration of the difference between Constitutional Law and Cons-
titutional Culture.  There is no legal obstacle to the use of referenda within the British 
51  HINDERAKER, Eric. Boston’s Massacre. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017. p. 201.
52  GEARTY, Conor. She’s dead of course!  The British Constitution and Human Rights. LSE Brexit Blog, London, 
8 aug. 2019. Available at:   <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/07/03/shes-dead-of-course-the-british-consti-
tution-brexit-and-human-rights/>. Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
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framework, and they have taken place before, the most significant being the 1975 vote 
on continuing membership of the (then) European Community, the 2011 vote on elec-
toral reform and the 2014 vote on Scottish Independence.53  However, the United King-
dom has no strong tradition of referenda, meaning that they do not have a clear and 
settled place within Constitutional Culture. Moreover, the lack of codification meant 
that there was scope for confused expectations around the implications of the outco-
me, and the fact that the previous referenda which would have been highest in the pu-
blic consciousness had all affirmed the status quo did not assist matters.  When a refe-
rendum came back with a victory for change, pandemonium was inevitably unleashed.
As a matter of strict Constitutional Law, there is no doubt that the result of a refe-
rendum could only ever be advisory.  Parliament is sovereign, those outside Parliament 
can express their opinions by referenda, petitioning, swamping social media, changing 
themselves to railings or however else they like, but its members are not legally obliged 
to listen.54  In many countries which operate referenda as a regular part of their cons-
titutional system, there are fixed rules which require more than a simple majority to 
change constitutional norms,55 and also frequent attempts to ensure that questions are 
clearly phrased (although it must be acknowledged that the experience of jurisdictions 
like Canada suggests that this can be a fount of dispute in its own right).56  
The United Kingdom was faced with a narrow majority in favour of leaving the 
European Union, and ample room for debate about what “leaving” meant.  Some Re-
main supporters have argued, for instance,57that people did not believe that in voting 
for Leave they were voting for a “no deal” Brexit, and were only consenting to a negotia-
ted departure. On the other side of the boxing-ring, many Leavers are protesting that 
to refuse or to stall Brexit is anti-democratic, and that whatever the technical legal po-
sition might be, an expectation was generated that the result of the referendum would 
be respected.  Clearly, there is some truth in this assertion, and it would be laughable to 
suggest that the Government of David Cameron arranged a referendum out of curiosity 
to test the waters.  
Gearty expresses a bewilderment, which many people share, in wondering what 
the thought-processes truly were behind the decision to hold a vote in the first place. 
53  UNITED KINGDOM. Parliament of the United Kingdom. Referendums held in the UK. Available at: <https://
www.parliament.uk/get-involved/elections/referendums-held-in-the-uk/>. Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
54  GARCÍA OLIVA, Javier; HALL, Helen.  Religion, Law and the Constitution: Balancing Beliefs in Britain. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2017. chapter 5.
55  SVENSSON, Pale. Denmark: The Referendum as Minority Protection. In: ULERI, Pier Vincenzo; GALLAGHER, 
Michael (Eds.). The Referendum Experience in Europe. London: Macmillan, 1996. p. 33-51.
56  RUSSEL, Peter. Constitution. COURTNEY, John C.; SMITH, David E. (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Canadi-
an Politics. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010, p. 21-38.
57  BARNES, Peter. Brexit: What Happens Now? BBC News, [s.l.], 31 oct. 2019. Available at: <https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/uk-politics-46393399>. Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
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This commentator is undoubtedly correct in pointing out that referenda are not an es-
tablished part of British Constitutional Culture, and that many of our current woes stem 
from disregarding our own norms and practices.  We have a long-established represen-
tative democracy, and referenda are simply not really how we “do” collective decision-
-making. Yet at the same time, there is a discomfort in some of the words with which he 
expresses his ire about a vote having been presented to the people:
It is not possible to detect any underlying rationale behind the ‘people’s vote’ – it is of the 
essence of populism of this sort – and as we all know Britain is not unique in its exposure 
to this kind of political engagement – that it knows what it does not like but has no clue 
as to what it wants. Depending on where you are, the vacuum gets filled by appeals to 
emotion that are rooted in any or all of nationalism, xenophobia and/or a personality 
cult. In the UK, I’d say this is mainly a geographically limited version of the first – English 
nationalist daydreaming rooted in fantasy history – but also a fair bit of cult (Farage, 
with Johnson jostling him for space) and among a few a particular subset of xenopho-
bia, the deeply unpleasant one that is rooted in traditional racism.58
The implication of this highly articulate passage, is that “the people” should not 
have been given the opportunity to make a direct decision, as they were incapable of 
sifting the arguments and voting on the basis of something other than emotion and 
a heady cocktail of xenophobia and nationalism, laced with celebrity.  This raises two 
questions: firstly, is that a just assessment of the British population and its capacities? 
and secondly, if it is, does it actually negate their “right” to democratically determine 
their own destiny?   Which brings us to our second and closely related question of the 
relationship between Parliament and the People.
4.2.  Parliament and the People
This is another aspect of British Constitutional Culture raised by Brexit. Unlike 
the use of referenda, we are not concerned here with a decision which has gone against 
the grain of prevailing Constitutional Culture, but rather a saga which has revealed a 
long-standing, dysfunctional aspect to it.   The conflicts of the XVII century resolved 
the balance of power between Parliament and the Crown, or the Legislature and the 
Executive, squarely in favour of Parliament.  This position was robustly affirmed in the 
Brexit process, with the Supreme Court’s confirmation that the Executive could not 
58  GEARTY, Conor. She’s dead of course!  The British Constitution and Human Rights. LSE Brexit Blog, London, 
8 aug. 2019. Available at:   <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/07/03/shes-dead-of-course-the-british-consti-
tution-brexit-and-human-rights/>. Last accessed: 9 dec. 2019.
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trigger Britain’s withdrawal without parliamentary empowerment.59  In short, the Miller 
case turned on the principle that the Government could not unilaterally take action 
which would remove legal rights conferred by an Act of Parliament.  It should be noted 
that even the dissenting judgment given by Lord Reed, was predicated on the basis 
that a proper interpretation of the European Communities Act 1972 meant that in wi-
thdrawing from the EU, the Government would not be removing statutory rights (as 
they were conferred to subsist only during EU membership), and not a single judge in 
the Supreme Court doubted Parliament’s sovereignty. In fact, its dominance over the 
Executive was affirmed time and again during the troubled premiership of Theresa May.
However, this leaves open the matter of the relationship between Parliament 
and the People.  One of the reasons why the debates around the meaning of the Brexit 
vote, and indeed the Miller case, have been so vituperative, is that both sides have been 
convinced that they are the ones truly advocating for “the People”. There is a long-stan-
ding school of British political thought, put forward by the Enlightenment politician 
and philosopher Edmund Burke, that MPs owe their constituents their judgement and 
integrity.  In order words, they are not representatives in the sense of voting according 
to the wishes of their electors, rather they are delegated to make such decisions as they 
see fit to further the common good.  On this basis, an MP should never vote against 
his or her own conscience, and endorse decisions which they believe to be wrong or 
damaging, purely because their constituents are clamouring for it.60   
Applying this approach, there is nothing problematic about suggesting that 
Parliamentarians should resist either Brexit or a “no-deal” Brexit, if they truly believe it to 
be destructive to the common good, but the complicating factor is that Edmund Burke 
was a Tory politician and has become associated with right-wing political thought, whe-
reas the Remain/Brexit divide is not a fissure along Left/Right lines. Remarkably, many 
of the individuals championing the supremacy of Parliament are not from parts of the 
political spectrum which would ordinarily look favourably on a paternalistic approach 
towards governance.
The truth is that this is an aspect which British Constitutional Culture never truly 
came to terms with, from the Early Modern period onwards.  The Civil Wars of the XVII 
century ended in a political meltdown and a military take-over, when the gentry in 
the House of Commons and the aristocracy in the House of Lords were dismissive of 
the views of the soldiers who had fought an ideological war.61  The English Republic, 
59  UNITED KINGDOM. United Kingdom Supreme Court. R (Miller) vs. Secretary of State for Exiting the Europe-
an Union, 2017.
60  UNITED KINGDOM. United Kingdom Supreme Court. R (Miller) vs. Secretary of State for Exiting the Europe-
an Union, 2017.
61  HILL, Christopher. The World Turned Upside Down: Radical ideas during the English Revolution. London: 
Penguin, 2019.
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however, ended with the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, and from this time onwards 
Parliament was firmly in control once more, as the “Glorious Revolution” demonstrated 
(a bloodless coup orchestrated by Parliament in which James II was deposed and his 
son-in-law/nephew William of Orange and daughter Mary came to the throne).62  
Yet as is well known, unlike most other European nations, Britain did not see 
revolution in the XVIII, XIX or XX centuries.  It slowly and incrementally transitioned 
from government by a propertied male elite, to a liberal, representative democracy in 
which all adult members had the expectation of participation.  This meant that there 
was never a decisive moment when the relationship between the Legislature and the 
people of the State was ever hammered out, either through political conflict, or debate 
following a crisis, and this also goes a long way towards explaining the somewhat alien 
nature of referenda in the British context, there was never a moment when circums-
tances necessitated identifying fundamental constitutional values which required a po-
pular, democratic decision to overturn, and therefore, also set out the parameters and 
mechanisms within which they could be set.  
Nevertheless, the issue is wider than referenda alone (discussed in the previous 
section), and it may be that Brexit is the crisis which finally forces the United Kingdom 
to think through how our sovereign Parliament should relate to the electorate as a who-
le in the modern era.  In confronting this aspect of our Constitutional Culture, which has 
often been swept under the carpet, we would be not only strengthening the realisation 
of the fundamental right to participate in democratic government, but we would also 
be embracing all other rights guaranteed by a liberal democratic State.   In light of this 
finding, we have arrived at an apt point to take stock of journey.
5.  CONCLUSIONS
Having addressed the nature of British Constitutional Culture, the place of hu-
man rights within it and the impact which the Brexit process is starting to have, what 
conclusions can we draw?  It is very much a tale of two halves, although the future of 
both are, of course, entwined.  
On the one hand, it is impossible to deny the fault lines which have opened up 
in terms of our democratic processes.  It is difficult to see how anyone, from any side of 
the political spectrum or Brexit debate, could assert that chaos caused by a referendum 
has been satisfactory, and that we need to collectively make an overall assessment of 
how we do democracy and why.  Should referenda play a part in our democratic pro-
cesses, and if so, when and how?  This is not a question simply about Constitutional Law 
62  GARCÍA OLIVA, Javier; HALL, Helen.  Religion, Law and the Constitution: Balancing Beliefs in Britain. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2017. chapter 1.
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and procedure, it goes directly to the heart of human rights, because such rights need 
a functional, liberal democratic context in which to live and flourish.
More optimistically, perhaps, we have seen how robust the concept of human 
rights has become in British Constitutional Culture, and there is now no suggestion that 
they are a recent, destructive import.  Their place within the legal framework is secure, 
and the judiciary have indicated their commitment to applying them in their adjudica-
tion, regardless of the repeal of the Human Rights Act or the ultimate trajectory of the 
Brexit process.  It is also reassuring that human rights are now embedded in popular 
Constitutional Culture, and that politicians of all stripes (save for the extreme fringes) 
accept that conceptually they must remain part of our common values.
Whatever form of new Constitutional Culture and settlement we ultimately 
emerge with, it is at least clear that human rights, in sense of identifiable freedoms whi-
ch can be named and asserted, will have a prized placed within its framework.
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